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Abstract
We study the effects of FOMC announcements of Federal funds target rate
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negative surprises is larger. Second, in case of bad news the mere occurrence
of a surprise matters most, whereas for good news its magnitude is more im-
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1 Introduction
This paper documents the presence of asymmetric effects of announcements of Fed-
eral Open Market Committee (FOMC) decisions concerning the Federal funds target
rate, on stock market returns, volatilities and correlations. For all three character-
istics we find that in case of bad news the mere occurrence of a monetary policy
surprise matters most, whereas in case of good news its magnitude is more impor-
tant.
The effects of monetary policy news announcements on exchange rates, interest
rates, and stock prices have been examined extensively. This has provided consid-
erable insight into the link between monetary policy and asset prices and, thereby,
has benefited our understanding of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
For example, an important common finding in the existing literature is that asset
returns and volatilities only respond to the surprise component in monetary policy
announcements. Our study makes three contributions. First, we focus on asymme-
tries in the effects of monetary policy surprises. Several such asymmetries have been
suggested in the literature, including the possibility that the response of stock prices
and volatility depends on the surprise being positive or negative, or on the direction
of the actual target rate change (Lobo, 2000; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005), or on
the phase of the business cycle (Guo, 2004; Andersen et al., 2007). The empirical
evidence for the presence of such asymmetric effects is, however, scarce. As discussed
in more detail below, this may be due to the use of daily measures of returns and
volatilities most previous literature has relied upon. Here we use intraday data so
that we can obtain more precise and less noisy estimates of the effects of monetary
1
policy surprises, and any asymmetries therein.
This use of intraday data is in itself a second contribution. Most previous studies
on the effects of monetary policy shocks on the stock market use daily data. As noted
by Bomfim (2003), this may reduce the precision with which the impact of target
rate announcements is estimated as other economic data could be released on the
same day, see also Fair (2002).1 In an extreme scenario, endogeneity may arise if
the stock market and monetary policy both respond simultaneously to other new
information, see Rigobon and Sack (2003, 2004) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)
for discussion.
Third, we use data at the individual stock level, which enables us to examine
the heterogeneity of the response across stocks and to explore the effects of mon-
etary policy news on correlations between stocks. Most existing research for the
stock market examines the effects of monetary policy surprises on the market as
a whole, see Bomfim (2003), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Boyd et al. (2005),
Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005), Hausman and Wongswan (2006), Andersen et al. (2007),
Zebedee et al. (2008), Wongswan (2009), and Andersson (in press), among others.
As a consequence, the extent of heterogeneity in the response to monetary policy
announcements across individual stocks is not well understood, although Ehrmann
and Fratzscher (2004) present evidence that this may be substantial.2 In addition,
due to the focus on the aggregate market reaction, the prior literature does not
1Wongswan (2006) illustrates this point in the context of transmission of information contained
in macroeconomic announcements across international equity markets. The effects of macroeco-
nomic announcements on exchange rates and interest rates are more commonly analyzed with
high-frequency intra-day data, see Andersen et al. (2003) and Faust et al. (2007), among others,
for recent examples.
2Guo (2004) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) also document different effects of monetary
policy surprises across size portfolios and across sectors, respectively.
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consider the effects of news announcements on correlations between stocks (or other
assets). A notable exception is Christiansen and Ranaldo (2007), who examine the
behavior of the correlation between stocks and bonds around news announcements.
Although our paper is related to the broader literature on the effects of macroe-
conomic news announcements on stock prices, we specifically focus on Federal funds
target rate announcements for two reasons. First, many other macroeconomic news
announcements are made prior to or at the opening of the stock exchange trading
day, which bars the use of high-frequency intraday data. Second, there is a natural
link between the discount rate and stock prices. The dividend discount model states
that the value of a stock is equal to the future cash flows expected to be generated
by the firm discounted at an appropriate risk-adjusted rate. In its most standard
setting the value of a stock is equal to the dividend per share divided by the dif-
ference between the discount rate and the dividend growth rate.3 Hence both an
expected increase (decrease) in the future discount rate as well as an unexpected
increase (decrease) in the current discount rate should lower (increase) stock prices.
A further advantage is that surprises in target rate changes can be derived from the
Federal funds futures rate, as first demonstrated by Kuttner (2001) and subsequently
adopted by Bomfim (2003), Fleming and Piazzesi (2005), Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005),
Zebedee et al. (2008) and Wongswan (2009), among others.
In our empirical analysis we examine the effects of Federal funds target rate
decisions made at scheduled FOMC meetings between May 1997 and October 2006
on intraday returns, volatilities and correlations of the constituents of the S&P100
3See Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) for an extensive analysis
of the question why stock prices respond to monetary policy news announcements and to target
rate surprises in particular, and also Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) on decomposing stock betas
into news about future cash flows and future discount rates.
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index. We measure the effects on returns during the five-minute interval immediately
following the announcement, and volatilities and correlations during the 60-minute
window starting 10 minutes before the target rate decision is made public. We
perform an extensive analysis for the presence of various asymmetries in the effects
of news announcements, by examining whether their effects are different for positive
and negative surprises, for target rate increases and decreases, and during economic
contractions and expansions.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we confirm existing
results that for returns and volatilities consistent with previous studies, our results
overwhelmingly show that indeed only surprises in target rate decisions matter, and
that the actual (or expected) rate changes do not. The stock market’s reaction to
surprises is fairly strong though. An unexpected 10 basis points increase of the
target rate leads to a 46 basis points negative return in the five minutes immediately
following the announcement4 and to a 51 basis points increase in volatility during a
60-minute window around the announcement.
Second, we find considerable heterogeneity in the effects of target rate surprises
on returns and volatilities across sectors. Financials and IT stocks show the strongest
response, while Utilities stocks show the weakest response. Concerning the persis-
tence of the effects of monetary policy surprises, they appear to trigger an immedi-
ate reaction in stock prices, in the sense that prices jump upon the public release
of FOMC decisions, with large returns occurring only during the first five minutes
after the announcement. The effects on volatility are much longer-lasting and are
4For a different sample period (1995-2002) and using a different methodology Zebedee et al.
(2008) report a negative market return of 48 basis points after a 25 basis points positive surprise.
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noticeable until at least an hour after the announcement, corroborating the results
of Andersen et al (2003, 2007).
Third, intraday correlations also are affected by unexpected target rate changes
only, with a surprise of 10 basis points doubling the average correlation between
stocks from 0.20 to 0.40. The effects are relatively short-lived, with correlations
returning to normal levels after around 15-30 minutes.
Fourth, we find that positive and negative target rate surprises have rather dif-
ferent effects on the stock market. In the former case (negative news for stocks),
the mere occurrence of a surprise triggers a reaction in stock prices, volatilities and
correlations, which is independent of the magnitude of the surprise. On the other
hand, for negative surprises (positive news for stocks), the magnitude of the surprise
clearly is important. As a result, the effects of negative news are larger than the ef-
fects of positive news for small magnitudes of the target rate surprise and vice versa
for large surprises. For example, an unexpected target rate decrease with 5 (15) basis
points provokes a positive return of 14 (73) basis points on average, compared to a
20 (36) basis points negative return following a positive surprise of the same magni-
tude. This is in contrast with Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), who find no evidence
for asymmetric effects of positive and negative news in FOMC decisions using daily
stock returns. This clearly demonstrates the advantage of using intraday data for
measuring the response of stock prices to (monetary policy) news announcements.
Fifth, we find that positive target rate surprises result in larger changes in stock
volatility than negative ones for realistic magnitudes of the surprise. A 5 (15) basis
points unexpected target rate increase also increases volatility by 50 (82) basis points,
whereas an unexpected decrease of the same magnitude increases volatility by 46
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(103) basis points. This result is partly in agreement with Bomfim (2003), who finds
that positive surprises in target rate changes tend to have a larger effect on daily
S&P500 index volatility than negative surprises.
Sixth and finally, we find that correlations between stocks increase more after
negative news. Correlations between stocks from the same sector increase by 0.27
(0.34) following a 5 (15) basis points unexpected target rate increase, and by 0.23
(0.45) following a negative surprise. This is intraday evidence of a well-documented
asymmetric response of correlations to positive and negative news, see Longin and
Solnik (2001), among others. Cappiello et al. (2006), for example, find that condi-
tional correlations among financial markets in the same region increase dramatically
when bad news hits the markets. Ang and Chen (2002) find that correlations be-
tween US stocks and the aggregate market are much higher for downside moves,
especially for extreme downside moves, than for upside moves.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our
data. Section 3 lays out the methodology we use to analyze the effects of FOMC
announcements on returns, volatilities and correlations of the S&P100 constituent
stocks and discusses the empirical results.5 Section 4 concludes.
2 Data
In this section we describe the available data set of FOMC announcements of Federal
funds target rate changes and intraday stock prices.
5Additional empirical results are provided in a supplemental Appendix to this paper.
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2.1 FOMC announcements and Federal funds target rate
surprises
We examine the effects of Federal funds target rate decisions made at scheduled
FOMC meetings between May 1997 and October 2006. The FOMC meets eight
times a year (approximately every six weeks), such that our sample period contains
77 target rate decisions. In addition, four unscheduled meetings were held during our
sample period, on October 15, 1998, January 3, 2001, April 18, 2001, and September
17, 2001. We omit these unscheduled meetings from our analysis, as they have rather
different effects than target rate decisions made at regular, scheduled meetings, see
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and Fleming and Piazzesi (2005).6
Given the forward-looking nature of financial markets, it is likely that antici-
pated target rate changes have already been incorporated in stock prices before the
actual change is announced. At least we should allow for the possibility that in-
vestors respond differently to expected and unexpected FOMC decisions. We use
the methodology proposed by Kuttner (2001) to obtain a measure of the surprise
in the Federal funds target rate change from the change in the current-month Fed-
eral funds futures rate on the day of the FOMC announcement.7 As the futures
contract’s payoff depends on the monthly average Federal funds rate, the change in
the futures rate is scaled up by a factor reflecting the number of remaining days in
6Appendix A shows that the target rate decisions made at these unscheduled meetings took the
market almost completely by surprise with the unexpected target rate change being almost equal
to the actual change, deviating substantially from scheduled announcements.
7Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) provide evidence that the effects of FOMC announcements have mul-
tiple dimensions that can be adequately captured by two factors, which are obtained as rotated
principal components of changes in Federal funds future rates for different maturities. The first
‘target’ factor closely corresponds with the surprise in the current-month Federal funds target rate,
while the second ‘path’ factor reflects market expectations of future policy actions. Given that
these two factors are orthogonal, the fact that we do not include the path factor in our regressions
does not affect our results on the effects of the surprise change in the current target rate on stock
prices. We leave a detailed investigation of the effects of the path factor for future research.
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the month, which are affected by the change. In sum, we compute the unexpected
target rate change or the “surprise” S as
S =
D
D − d
(
f 0d − f 0d−1
)
, (1)
where f 0d is the current-month futures rate at the end of the announcement day d,
and D is the number of days in the month. In order to avoid disturbances from end-
of-month effects in the effective funds rate, we use the change in the next month’s
futures rate for announcements made within the last seven calendar days of the
month, following Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and Fleming and Piazzesi (2005).
Throughout the empirical analysis below the surprise S is measured in basis points.
Appendix A shows the dates of the FOMC meetings and the changes in the
Federal funds target rate together with the corresponding surprises. The mean
(median) surprise for the 77 scheduled FOMC meetings is equal to −0.23 (0.00)
basis points with a standard deviation of 4.35 basis points, suggesting that market
expectations of these monetary policy actions are essentially unbiased. Interestingly,
there is a substantial difference in variability of the surprises for the different types
of FOMC decisions. The standard deviation of surprises in case of a target rate
decrease is equal to 9.51 basis points, compared to only 2.73 and 2.56 basis points in
case the FOMC decides to lower the target rate or to leave it unchanged, respectively.
Admittedly these numbers are based on small samples (during our sample period, the
target rate was increased (decreased) 23 (12) times), but they nevertheless suggest
that uncertainty is considerably larger when monetary policy actions are tightening
than when they are loosening.8
8We also observe a marked decline in the standard deviation of the target rate surprises from
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2.2 Intra-day stock returns
The stock price data set consists of open, high, low, and close transaction prices at
the one-minute sampling frequency for the June 2004 S&P100 index constituents for
the period from April 16, 1997 until November 3, 2006. For some stocks the price
series start at a later date, while for others they stop earlier. On average, prices are
available for 94 stocks at the time of the 77 scheduled FOMC meetings.
From the one-minute closing prices we obtain intraday returns, volatilities and
correlations as follows. First, we compute five-minute returns for a window sur-
rounding the FOMC announcements, from 15 minutes before until 75 minutes after
the announcement. In the return regressions discussed in Section 3 we use the stock
returns during the five-minute interval immediately following the announcement as
the dependent variable, following the evidence reported in the literature that the
effects on price levels occur instantaneously and are short-lived, see Ederington and
Lee (1995) and Andersen et al. (2007), among others. The use of precise announce-
ment times is therefore essential for the accuracy of this analysis. Although the
FOMC announcements are scheduled to be released at 14:15 EST, in practice the
exact timing has varied by up to several minutes. We therefore make use of exact
announcement times obtained from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors,9 which
are shown in Appendix A. For volatilities, it has been found that announcement ef-
fects are more sluggish and last longer, see Ederington and Lee (1993) and Fleming
and Remolona (1997), among others. For that reason we focus on the 60-minute
5.34 basis points before the August 2003 meeting to just 1.22 basis points thereafter. This may
be related to changes in the Federal Reserve’s communication policy during the Greenspan era,
see Kohn and Sack (2004), Poole (2005), Swanson (2006), and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007a,b),
among others.
9We are grateful to Jonathan Wright for providing these exact announcement times.
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window between 10 minutes before the announcement until 50 minutes thereafter,
following Fleming and Piazzesi (2005).10 In particular, we compute the realized
volatility (RV) for stock i for the announcement on day t as
RVit =
√√√√ u∑
k=l
R2it,k, (2)
where Rit,k is the five-minute return for stock i in interval k of day t, with the
interval k = 0 corresponding to the first five minutes after the announcement, where
we set l = −2 and u = 9 to capture the selected 60-minute window.11 Similarly, the
realized correlation (RC) between stocks i and j for the announcement on day t is
computed as
RCijt =
∑u
k=lRit,kRjt,k
RVitRVjt
, (3)
where RVit and RVjt are the realized volatilities for stocks i and j computed accord-
ing to (2).
3 Methodology and empirical results
This section consists of three parts, analyzing the effects of FOMC target rate deci-
sions on stock returns, on volatilities, and on correlations, respectively. In each case
both the employed methodology and the results are presented. The regressions be-
low are implemented at the individual stock level. To save space, we present results
10We examine the robustness of our results with respect to the length of this window, by repeating
the complete analysis with volatilities and correlations over 30- and 90-minute windows (starting
5 and 15 minutes before the announcement, respectively) as well. In general we find that results
and conclusions are robust to the choice of window length.
11It may appear that realized volatility as defined in (2) is not suitable for properly measuring
the effects of target rate decisions on volatility as it includes the possible jump in prices due to the
FOMC announcements. To disentangle the continuous and jump parts of total variation, we use the
concept of bipower variation (BPV) proposed by Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004), see also
Andersen et al. (2007). Bipower variation, defined as the sum of cross-products of absolute returns
in adjacent five-minute returns, that is, BPVit = pi2
∑u−1
k=l |Rit,k||Rit,k+1|, is not affected by the
presence of price jumps and delivers a consistent estimate of the continuous volatility part. Using
this BPV measure instead of RV we obtain similar conclusions, see the supplemental Appendix.
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aggregated to the market and sector levels, by taking averages of the coefficients for
the relevant individual stocks.12 This enables us to assess the average effects of tar-
get rate changes on the market as a whole and any differences therein across sectors.
Results for the individual stocks are occasionally presented to further illustrate the
pervasiveness and heterogeneity of the response of stock prices to monetary policy
announcements.13
3.1 The effect of FOMC meetings on stock returns
Table 1 shows means and standard deviations of the returns of individual stocks
aggregated to the market and sector levels during the five-minute interval immedi-
ately following the Federal funds target rate announcements. The first column shows
averages taken over all 77 scheduled FOMC meetings. These overall average returns
are negative and significantly different from zero at the 1% level for the market and
for all sectors. In order to gain more insight in the cause for these negative returns,
we split the sample into several subgroups defined by the nature of the target rate
change and the surprise component.
- insert Table 1 about here -
The second and third columns of Table 1 show the average return for those
meetings at which the FOMC decided to increase (23 times) or decrease (12 times)
12Throughout, the reported standard errors for these average coefficients allow for heteroskedas-
ticity as well as correlation of residuals across stocks, see Petersen (2009).
13Detailed results for the individual stocks can be found in the supplemental Appendix. As
a robustness check, we also implemented the regression analysis for sector and market returns,
obtained as equally weighted returns of the individual stocks. This renders very similar estimates
of the average effects of FOMC announcements. The main difference occurs in the fit of the
regressions as measured by the R2, which is considerably higher for the market and sector returns
than for the average individual stock. This can be attributed to the fact that the aggregate returns
contain much less idiosyncratic noise.
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the target rate. The average returns following target rate decreases and increases are
small as expected, given that the average surprises therein are small as well, being
equal to −0.80 and 0.32 basis points, respectively.
The final two columns show the results for positive and negative surprises sep-
arately. Now we do observe a substantial response in stock returns. Recall that a
positive surprise means that the target rate was increased more or decreased less
than the market anticipated. This represents bad news for stocks as in this case
the market underestimated the future discount factor. Hence, we see that the an-
nouncement of the FOMC decision triggers a significantly negative reaction in stock
prices. Similarly, a negative surprise implies that the target rate ended up lower
than expected. This is good news for stocks, which duly show a significant positive
return. Also note that the response to negative news for stocks is larger than to
positive news. After positive target rate surprises the average five-minute return is
−21.1 basis points compared to 12.2 basis points after negative surprises. We observe
significantly negative and positive returns following positive and negative surprises
for all sectors, although there is considerable heterogeneity in magnitude. Average
returns are largest for IT, Financials, Consumer Discretionary, and Telecommunica-
tions, while they are smallest for Utilities, Energy and Health Care stocks.
We examine the speed at which the market responds to the FOMC announce-
ments by computing the average returns in five-minute intervals around the time of
the news release, as shown in Figure 1, where we distinguish between average returns
following positive, negative and zero surprises. As expected the response to target
rate changes occurs mostly during the first five minutes after the announcement. In-
terestingly, we observe that the average returns between 5 and 20 minutes after the
12
announcement are negative for both negative and positive target rate surprises. This
suggests some sort of overreaction of stock prices to positive news and underreaction
to negative news. The change in stock prices following target rate surprises appears
to be permanent with bad news having a larger price impact, as the (unreported)
cumulative returns up to 75 minutes after the announcement are equal to −30 and
20 basis points for positive and negative surprises, respectively.
- insert Figure 1 about here -
Combining the average five-minute returns of −21.1 and 12.2 basis points fol-
lowing positive and negative target rate surprises with the overall average return of
−3.8 basis points in Table 1 implies that the average return following the 23 an-
nouncements for which the surprise was equal to zero is less than minus one basis
point. This indicates that the stock market is efficient to the extent that expected
target rate changes are already incorporated into stock prices prior to the FOMC
meetings and that only surprises lead to a reaction of stock prices. We continue with
running three regressions, intended to confirm this formally and to examine whether
the magnitude of the surprise is important. The first regression relates the stock
return to the actual target rate change,
Rit = αi + βi∆FFt + εit, (4)
where Rit is the return for stock i in the five-minute interval following the news
release on day t, and ∆FFt is the actual change in the Federal funds target rate,
both measured in basis points. The second regression decomposes the actual target
rate change in the expected component and the surprise,
Rit = αi + βiSt + γi(∆FFt − St) + εit, (5)
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where St is the surprise (in basis points) measured by means of the change in the
Federal funds futures rate, as defined in (1). If indeed only the surprise component in
the target change affects stock prices, we would expect γi to be equal to zero and βi to
be significantly negative, where the expected sign follows from the fact that positive
surprises mean bad news for stocks. In the third regression we account for the fact
that certain ‘special’ FOMC announcements may have different effects than ‘regular’
target rate decisions. Results based on daily returns in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)
suggest that in particular this applies to so-called ‘reversal decisions’ changing the
direction of short-term interest rates, that is, the first target rate increase following
a period of decreases or vice versa. Preliminary analysis14 indicates that this is
relevant for the reversal decisions during our sample period, taken at the meetings
on September 29, 1998, on June 30, 1999 and on June 30, 2004.15 To allow for
different effects of these reversal decisions, we estimate the regression
Rit = αi + βiSt + γi(∆FFt − St) + δiStD(REVt) + εit, (6)
where D(REVt) is a 0-1 dummy indicating whether or not a reversal decision was
taken in the meeting at time t. Estimation results for these three regressions for
the individual stocks aggregated to the market level (all stocks) and sector level are
presented in Table 2.
- insert Table 2 about here -
14Among others, this is based on the computation of influence statistics for each observation in
the sample, see also Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). These indicate that especially announcements
of reversal decisions have a large influence on the estimation results for the regression in (5).
15Recall that we omit the unscheduled meeting on January 3, 2001, which also involved a reversal
decision.
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The results overwhelmingly confirm that surprises matter while the actual target
rate changes do not. Consider the regression of the five-minute post-announcement
stock returns on the surprise and the expected target rate change as given in (5). The
average coefficient estimates in the first row of Table 2 imply a five-minute return
of −46 basis points following a surprise of 10 basis points in the target rate change,
corresponding quite closely with estimates reported by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)
based on daily CRSP value-weighted index returns. The coefficient of the expected
rate change is positive at 0.12 but not significantly different from zero. This is con-
sistent with market efficiency in that stock prices fully reflect expected interest rate
changes, and react to new information only. The estimation results averaged to the
sector level reveal considerable differences in the effects of target rate surprises across
sectors, where our findings are in partial agreement with Ehrmann and Fratzscher
(2004). We confirm their conclusion that stocks in non-cyclical sectors such as Util-
ities, Consumer Staples, Health Care, and Energy are less responsive to target rate
surprises than the aggregate market. On the other hand, we do not find that cyclical
and capital-intensive sectors such as Telecommunications, Consumer Discretionary,
and Industrials are more responsive than the market average. Note though that
Consumer Discretionary is in the top 3 in terms of average returns when consid-
ering positive and negative surprises separately, see the final two columns in Table
1, suggesting that asymmetric effects may be relevant for this sector. Conversely,
while Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) find the reaction of stocks in the Financials
sector to be very close to the market average, our results suggest that these stocks
are most sensitive to target rate surprises, with the average estimate of the surprise
coefficient in (5) being almost one and a half times larger than the market average.
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Finally, we find relatively strong effects of the target rate surprises on IT stocks,
which can perhaps be explained by the fact that during our sample period IT firms
are largely built on future earnings instead of current earnings. Hence the discount
factor would have a larger effect on the value of IT stocks.
The four columns on the right of Table 2 demonstrate that allowing for different
effects of reversals is warranted, as the average δi estimates are significantly different
from zero at the 5% level or better for the market level and for all sectors except
Materials. Including the reversal term also leads to a substantial improvement of
the explanatory power of the regression, with the average R2 increasing from 0.19 to
0.28. We observe that reversals have much larger effects than ‘regular’ target rate
decisions, with the average coefficient for reversals being equal to −18.08 compared
to −3.97 for regular surprises. The effects of reversals also varies across sectors,
with by far the largest effects occurring for stocks in the Financials sector, where
an unexpected 10 basis points increase of the target rate in a reversal decision leads
to a return of no less than −3.36 percent. Finally, compared to (5) allowing for
different effects of reversals leads to smaller coefficients (in absolute value) for regular
surprises, but all conclusions drawn previously continue to hold, including those with
respect to heterogeneity across sectors.
The pervasiveness and heterogeneity of the response of stock prices to target rate
surprises can perhaps best be seen from the regression results for the 100 individual
stocks. Based on (6), the estimate of the surprise coefficient is significantly negative
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for 61, 26, and 3 stocks, respectively. The majority of
the individual betas are between −2 and −5, but some are even below −8. We refer
to Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) for a detailed analysis of the possible determinants
16
of the heterogeneity in response to target rate surprises across firms. In addition to
the industry effects discussed above, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) document that
small firms and financially-constrained firms respond significantly more to monetary
policy surprises than large and less constrained ones.16
Given the above results, we focus on the effects of surprises in the target rate
decisions in more detail. In particular, we examine the presence of different types
of asymmetries in their effects on stock prices. As discussed in the introduction,
different types of asymmetries may be present, depending on the sign of the surprise
(bad news vs. good news), the direction of the target rate decision (loosening vs.
tightening monetary policy), and the macroeconomic environment (expansions vs.
recessions) .17 The average returns in Table 1 suggest that these asymmetric effects
may also be relevant for the S&P100 constituents, for example for Consumer Dis-
cretionary stocks, as mentioned before. We assess the empirical evidence for these
asymmetries more formally using an extension of the previous regressions. For ex-
ample, we test whether the post-announcement return is different following positive
and negative surprises, and whether only the occurrence of a surprise matters or also
its magnitude by means of the regression
Rit = α0i+(α1i+β1iSt)D(St < 0)+(α2i+β2iSt)D(St > 0)+δiStD(REVt)+εit, (7)
where D(A) is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the event A is true and 0
otherwise. Regression results are presented in Table 3, showing average coefficient
estimates across all stocks and across stocks within a given sector, as before.
16Using decile portfolios, Guo (2004) finds that the size effect in the responsiveness to monetary
policy only occurs during economic recessions but not during booms.
17Fleming and Piazzesi (2005) document an asymmetric response of Treasury note yields de-
pending on the slope of the yield curve. We find no such asymmetry for the S&P100 stocks and
hence do not consider this further.
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- insert Table 3 about here -
We observe a marked difference between positive and negative surprises. The
average estimate of β1i is significant at the 1% level for both the market level and
for all individual sectors, while the average α1i is not significant except for the IT and
Telecommunications sectors. This implies that for negative surprises, meaning good
news for stocks, the magnitude of the surprise is much more important than the fact
that the actual target rate decision is different from market expectations. In contrast,
in the case of positive target rate surprises, or bad news for stocks, it is not possible
to determine whether the fact that there is a surprise or its magnitude is more
important, as the average estimates of α2i and β2i are not significant individually,
with a few exceptions. Note that this should not be interpreted as saying that stocks
do not respond to positive surprises at all. In fact a Wald test shows that jointly the
averages of α2i and β2i are significant at the 10% level or better for the market and all
sectors except Energy, Financials, Health Care and Materials. In addition, it is useful
to point out that the coefficient estimates imply that the response to negative news
is in fact larger than the effect of positive news for realistic magnitudes of the target
rate surprise of less than eight basis points, which occurs for more than 90 percent
of the observations in our sample. For example, an unexpected increase of the target
rate with 3.6 basis points (which is the mean absolute surprise across the non-zero
surprises) provokes a negative market return of −18.0 basis points, compared to a
positive return of only 5.8 basis points following an unexpected decrease of the target
rate of the same magnitude.
The asymmetric effect of the magnitude of positive and negative surprises is also
visible when considering the individual stock returns. The estimate of β1i in (7) is
18
negative in all 100 cases and significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for 77, 7, and
6 stocks, respectively. The corresponding numbers for β2i are 0, 3, and 11. The
difference between β1i and β2i is negative for all stocks, with the average being equal
to −4.27. A Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the average difference is equal
to zero at the 1% level, see Table 3. Note also that the Wald tests in Table 3 indicate
that the asymmetry of positive and negative surprises is due to different responses
to the magnitude and not to the occurrence of a surprise, as the null hypothesis
β1i = β2i can be rejected at the market level and for most sectors, while the null
α1i = α2i cannot.
The above results differ markedly from the findings of Bernanke and Kuttner
(2005), who document weak support at best for asymmetric effects of positive and
negative surprises based on daily returns. This demonstrates the advantage of using
intraday data.18 Repeating our regression analysis using daily returns, we find that
also at the daily level stock prices respond to surprises but not to expected target
rate changes. The regression R2s in (5) and (6), however, are substantially lower,
that is, noise contaminates the analysis when using daily data. For example, using
daily individual stock returns as dependent variable, the R2 of (6) is 0.07 only. We
also find some asymmetry, with the average estimates α2i and β1i in (7) across all
stocks being significant (confirming that in case of negative news for stocks only the
fact that there is a surprise matters, while for positive news the magnitude of the
surprise is relevant), but at much lower significance levels. This indicates that using
daily data makes it difficult to draw the same clearcut conclusions as we can do here
18A second difference in methodology is that Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) use market and sector
index returns. We find that this difference is not important, as intraday market and sector returns
render comparably strong evidence for asymmetry.
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based on intraday data.
Our findings for the other two types of asymmetry are much less supportive.
First, we do not find any significant asymmetry in the effects of surprises depending
on whether the target rate is increased or decreased or left unchanged. Bernanke
and Kuttner (2005) reach a similar conclusion with respect to the effects for rate
increases and decreases, but do find that the market responds very little, if at all,
to “policy inactions”. Second, we find no evidence for different effects of target
rate surprises in business cycle recessions and expansions. This holds irrespective of
whether we use the official NBER turning points (according to which the recession
period is April 2001 through November 2001 with six FOMC meetings), or whether
we follow Andersen et al. (2007) and define the start (end) of a recession when there
are three consecutive monthly declines (increases) in nonfarm payroll employment
(leading to a longer recession from March 2001 through December 2002 with 20
FOMC meetings). This is in contrast to Andersen et al. (2007), who find that
equity markets only react according to expectations to target rate surprises during
recessions, while during expansions the response is not significant.19 Possibly this
is due to our use of a longer sample period, with the larger number of observations
leading to more precise estimates of the effects of FOMC announcements.
3.2 The effect of FOMC meetings on stock volatilities
We now turn to the impact of FOMC target rate decisions on stock return volatility.
As discussed in Section 2, we consider the realized volatility (RV) for the 60-minute
window starting 10 minutes before the target rate decision is made public, see (2).
19Andersen et al. (2007) document even more pronounced business cycle effects in asset prices’
response to news concerning real activity, with bad news unexpectedly having a positive impact
during expansions and the expected negative impact during recessions; see also Boyd et al. (2005).
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We focus on the difference between RVit on the announcement day and the day
before given the ample empirical evidence that the level of volatility changes over
time, which may obscure the effects of Federal funds target rate changes.20
- insert Table 4 about here -
The summary statistics in Table 4 clearly demonstrate that FOMC news leads to
a substantial volatility increase for the S&P100 constituents. Across all stocks and
all FOMC meetings we observe an average increase in realized volatility of 34.8 basis
points, with a standard deviation of 57.2. As expected, among the different sectors
Financials experiences the largest volatility change at 50.4 basis points, closely fol-
lowed by IT and Telecommunications. Again it seems that the impact of FOMC
announcements is smallest for the Utilities, Energy and Health Care sectors. The
second and third columns show that the average volatility change is considerably
larger following target rate decreases than increases. For the market as a whole, on
days with target rate decreases the change in volatility equals 66.7 basis points on
average, compared to 33.6 on days with target rate increases. This difference may
be due to several reasons. First, as mentioned in Section 2.1, the standard deviation
of surprises in case of a target rate decrease is more than three times larger than in
case of target rate increases. Second, below we also discuss that during recessions,
obviously periods of rate decreases, markets react more strongly to surprises, which
results in larger volatility increases.21
20Bomfim (2003) documents the presence of a so-called ‘calm-before-the-storm’ effect, that is,
volatility tends to be depressed on pre-announcement days. This does not affect the results of
our analysis, as we obtain qualitatively and quantitatively similar results when using the difference
between the realized volatility on announcement days and the average volatility during the previous
five trading days excluding the day before the announcement.
21In addition, we note that all 12 target rate decreases happened prior to August 2003 when
FOMC introduced more explicit forward-looking language into its press statement resulting in a
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From the final two columns of Table 4 we observe that for FOMC decisions which
surprised the market the change in volatility is larger than when considering all an-
nouncements. This holds at the market level as well as for all sectors. There does not
appear to be a large difference between negative and positive surprises when looking
at these average volatility changes. The average change in volatility considering all
77 FOMC meetings and all stocks is equal to 34.8 basis points, whereas it is higher
at 45.7 after the 28 positive surprises and 42.5 after the 26 negative surprises. From
these numbers it also follows that the average change in volatility in case the FOMC
announcement does not contain a surprise is equal to 12.4 basis points only.
To gauge the persistence of the increase in volatility after FOMC announcements,
we consider absolute stock returns in five-minute intervals between 15 minutes before
and 75 minutes after the time of the release of the FOMC target rate decisions.
We compute averages across all stocks of the change in absolute return relative to
the pre-announcement day, again to account for time-varying volatility. These are
shown in Figure 2 for announcements containing positive, negative and no surprises
separately. We observe that the increase in volatility is persistent if the actual
target rate does not correspond with the market expectations. Bad news appears
to have larger and longer lasting effects on stock volatility than good news, except
for the initial impact during the first five minutes after the announcement.22 The
relevance of this asymmetry is analyzed more rigorously using regression analysis
substantial decline of the standard deviation of surprises from 5.34 basis points to 1.22 basis points.
Related to this, the average change in realized volatility following the 17 target rate increases after
August 2003 is substantially smaller (23.7 basis points) than following the six target rate increases
before August 2003 (61.6).
22The fact that the average absolute return immediately following the announcement is larger
after negative surprises does not contradict Figure 1. The smaller average positive return following
good news observed there is based on more extreme positive and negative returns for individual
meetings than the larger negative return after bad news.
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below. Finally, Figure 2 also shows that volatility does increase after announcements
with no surprise element, but to a lesser extent and for a much shorter period of
time, returning to normal levels around 30 minutes after the news release.
- insert Figure 2 about here -
We examine the effects of target rate changes and surprises on stock volatility
by means of regressions similar to the ones used for stock returns in the previous
subsection, except that for obvious reasons we now use absolute target rate changes
and surprises. Specifically, we regress the daily change in the 60-minute realized
volatility on the absolute actual target rate change, and on the absolute surprise
and the absolute expected target rate change with or without allowing for different
effects of reversal decisions, that is
∆RVit = αi + βi|∆FFt|+ εit, (8)
∆RVit = αi + βi|St|+ γi|∆FFt − St|+ εit, (9)
∆RVit = αi + βi|St|+ γi|∆FFt − St|+ δi|St|D(REVt) + εit, (10)
where ∆RVit denotes the difference between realized volatility for stock i during the
60-minute window starting 10 minutes before the target rate decision is made public
and during the same window on the day before.
The results in Table 5 show that the stock volatilities respond to the (absolute)
surprise and not to the expected target rate change. We do find that the average
estimates of the actual target rate change coefficient in (8) are significantly positive
at the market and sector levels, but splitting this into the expected target rate change
and the surprise as in (9) shows that this is due entirely to the latter component.
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The estimates of the surprise coefficients are positive and highly significant, in both
(9) and (10). The average estimate of βi in (9) for the market RV implies that
an unexpected target rate change of 3.6 basis points (the mean absolute surprise
across the non-zero surprises) leads to an increase of volatility by 18.5 basis points
during the 60-minute window around the announcement. Financials, as expected,
shows the strongest response to surprises with the average estimated coefficient for
St being equal to 7.8 in (9), considerably larger than the market average of 5.2. The
Utilities sector forms the other extreme, with an average surprise coefficient of 2.5
only. For the individual stocks, the estimate of βi in (9) is positive for all stocks
and significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level for 66 stocks, with
another 15 and 5 coefficients being significant at the 5% and 10% significance levels,
respectively. The majority of the individual betas are between 3 and 9, showing that
there is considerable heterogeneity in the effects of target rate surprises on individual
stock volatility.
The results for the effects of reversals on volatility based on (10) also are inter-
esting. Averaging across all stocks, we find a significant estimate of δi at 8.3, which
is larger than the average effect of regular surprises at 5.1. Looking at individual
sectors, we observe substantial heterogeneity, with significant estimates occurring
only for Financials, Consumer Discretionary and Consumer Staples. For these sec-
tors the effects of reversals do seem particularly strong though, being about three
times as large as the effects of regular surprises.
- insert Table 5 about here -
In the remainder of this section we analyze the effects of surprises on volatility
in more detail, again focusing on possible asymmetries. In particular, the volatility
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literature strongly suggests that the response of volatility to negative news is stronger
than the response to positive news. This can conveniently be examined by the
regression
∆RVit = α0i + (α1i + β1i|St|)D(St < 0)+
(α2i + β2i|St|)D(St > 0) + δi|St|D(REVt) + εit. (11)
The results presented in Table 6 reveal marked differences between positive and
negative surprises. For negative surprises, representing good news for stocks, the
magnitude of the surprise is far more important than the occurrence of a positive
surprise, as the average β1i estimate is significant at the 1% level for both the market
level and for individual sectors, while the average α1i estimates are not significant at
all. In contrast, in the case of positive surprises, thus bad news for stocks, both the
fact that there is a negative surprise and the magnitude of the surprise are relevant,
as both the average α2i and β2i are significant for the market and for most sectors.
The magnitude of the estimates of α2i also suggest that negative news leads to a
sizable jump in volatility, irrespective of the magnitude of the surprise. In fact the
average taken over all stocks at 21.0 is more than 4 times larger than the average α1i
at 5.0, while this difference is significant at the 5% level according to the Wald test
reported in Table 6. Whereas the average β1i at 5.7 is clearly larger than the average
β2i at 3.3, this difference is not significant at the 10% level. We only find significant
differences in these slope coefficients for Consumer Discretionary and Energy stocks.
In sum, just like for returns, the occurrence of a surprise is more important for
negative news while the magnitude of the surprise is more important for positive
news. Finally, the average coefficient estimates in (11) imply that stock volatility
25
reacts more strongly to negative news than to positive news for surprises less than
6.6 basis points and vice versa for larger surprises. Hence for realistic magnitudes of
the surprise, bad news has a larger impact than good news. An unexpected target
rate increase with 3.6 basis points, for example, implies an average volatility increase
of 45.3 basis points, compared to 38 basis points following an unexpected target rate
decrease of the same magnitude.
- insert Table 6 about here -
For the other possible asymmetries that we examine, we do observe some differ-
ences in the response of volatility to FOMC surprises depending on the type of target
rate change, but according to Wald tests these generally are not significant. This
is in contrast to Lobo (2000), who (using daily data and a different methodology)
documents moderate evidence for an increase in aggregate stock market volatility
following target rate cuts but not following rate hikes. Allowing for different news
effects over the business cycle, we find more pronounced asymmetries. In particular,
the average volatility change following an FOMC announcement is larger during re-
cessions, while the surprise coefficient is larger during expansions. The differences
are significant at the market level and for several sectors. Hence, this suggests that
FOMC announcements lead to a larger jump in volatility, independent of the magni-
tude of the target rate surprise during recessions, while the magnitude of the surprise
is more important during expansions. We do hesitate to draw firm conclusions from
this finding though, given the small number of recession observations in our sample
period.
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3.3 The effect of FOMC meetings on stock correlations
We next consider the impact of FOMC meetings on intraday realized correlations
during the 60-minute window around target rate announcements, computed accord-
ing to (3). In order to control for time-variation in correlations for reasons other
than the FOMC announcements, we consider the difference between these realized
correlations on the announcement day and on the day before.
We compute daily changes in the correlations between individual stocks, and
average these to ‘within sectors’ (inter) and ‘between sectors’ (intra) levels. Table 7
(intra-sector) and 8 (inter-sector) both clearly demonstrate that FOMC news leads
to a substantial increase in correlations between the S&P100 constituents, by 0.19
and 0.18, respectively. On days with actual rate changes the increase is even 0.25,
which also is higher than the average correlation increase for surprises at around
0.21. The largest increase is found in the intra-sector correlations for Financials,
which equals 0.33 after target rate increases. The correlations between Energy stocks
increase the least, being just 0.10 higher than in the corresponding window the day
before. Differences in increases in correlations between stocks from different sectors
are less pronounced, ranging between 0.16 (averaged across all meetings for pairwise
correlations that involve an Energy stock) and 0.29 (average changes following target
rate increases for pairwise correlations that involve a Telecommunications stock).
- insert Tables 7 and 8 about here -
Figure 3 shows averages across all pairs of stocks i and j of the cross-product
of five-minute returns from 15 minutes before until 75 minutes after the announce-
ment time, normalized with their realized volatilities over the same window, that
27
is (Rit,kRjt,k)/(RVitRVjt), where RVit and RVjt are computed according to (2) with
l = −3 and u = 14. Note that this quantity can be interpreted as the contri-
bution of the k-th five-minute interval to the total realized correlation during the
90-minute window around the announcement time. As before we compute averages
for announcements with positive, negative and no surprises separately, and control
for time-variation in the level of correlations by computing changes relative to the
pre-announcement day.
Figure 3 demonstrates that the effect of monetary policy surprises is large during
the first minutes after the news release. The effects are relatively short-lived though,
with correlations returning to normal levels after around 15-30 minutes. Negative
surprises have a larger initial impact than positive surprises, but this is reversed
during subsequent intervals, suggesting that also for correlations bad news may have
more persistent effects than good news.
- insert Figure 3 about here -
Following Christiansen and Ranaldo (2007), in the regressions below that are
used to examine the effects of target rate surprises on realized correlations we use
the Fisher transformation,
F (RCijt) =
1
2
log
(
1 +RCijt
1−RCijt
)
.
Again, to avoid that the effects of FOMC announcements are blurred by changes in
the correlations due to other reasons, we consider the difference between F (RC) on
the announcement day and the day before. Specifically, we regress the daily change
in transformed realized correlations on the absolute actual target rate change, and on
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the absolute surprise and the absolute expected target rate change with or without
allowing for different effects of reversal decisions, that is,
∆F (RCijt) = αij + βij|∆FFt|+ εij,t, (12)
∆F (RCijt) = αij + βij|St|+ γij|∆FFt − St|+ εij,t, (13)
∆F (RCijt) = αij + βij|St|+ γij|∆FFt − St|+ δij|St|D(REVt) + εij,t, (14)
compare the regressions for realized volatility in (8)-(10).
Regression results are provided in Tables 9 (intra-sector) and 10 (inter-sector).
Just like for volatilities we find that the significance of the actual absolute target
rate change in (12) is completely due to the surprise component, as shown by the
estimation results for (13) and (14). Across all stock pairs within sectors, the average
surprise coefficient is highly significant and equal to 2.1. Note that due to the Fisher
transformation, the effect of surprises on the correlations is highly nonlinear and, in
particular, depends on the level of the pre-announcement correlation. For the average
pre-announcement correlation between stocks of 0.20, the models in (13) and (14)
imply that a surprise of 10 basis points leads to an increase of 0.19 in the realized
correlation. Correlations between Consumer Discretionary stocks, Financials, and
Materials stocks increase most after surprises. Correlations between Utilities stocks
and between Energy stocks respond the least, and not significantly. For the reversal
decisions we find mixed results. The average effect is significantly positive for intra-
sector correlations for Financials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples and
IT, as before. For other sectors we do not find significant average δij coefficients,
while for Materials and Telecommunications the estimates even are significantly
negative. Similar results are obtained for correlations between stocks from different
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sectors, although in that case next to surprises also actual rate changes have some
positive impact on correlations.
- insert Tables 9 and 10 about here -
We conclude this section by examining whether there is a different response in
intra- and inter-sector correlations following positive and negative surprises, and
whether only the size of the surprise matters or also the fact that there is a surprise.
This is accomplished by estimating the regression
∆F (RCijt) = α0ij + (α1ij + β1ij|St|)D(St < 0)+
(α2ij + β2ij|St|)D(St > 0) + δij|St|D(REVt) + εij,t, (15)
compare (11), for all pairs of stocks i and j.
The results of this regression are presented in Tables 11 and 12 for intra-sector
and inter-sector stock pairs, respectively. The most interesting results can be seen
from comparing the average estimates of the alpha and beta coefficients. Similar to
our findings for returns and volatilities, it appears that for correlations the fact that
there is a surprise is more important for positive surprises, whereas the magnitude
of the surprise is more important for negative surprises. Considering all correlations
between stocks from the same sector (first row Table 11) the average β1ij (measuring
the effect of the magnitude of the positive news of correlations) is significant at 2.95,
whereas β2ij (negative news) is not. The Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that
the two average betas are equal at the 5% significance level. On the other hand
the average α2ij (occurrence of negative news for stocks) at 10.1 is significant at the
10% level and more than 5 times larger than the insignificant average of α1ij (pos-
itive news) at −1.9. Translating these results into changes in correlations, we find
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that intra-sector correlations increase by 0.27 (0.34) following a 5 (15) basis points
unexpected target rate increase, and by 0.23 (0.45) following a negative surprise.
For the individual sectors, despite having much less observations, these conclusions
are strongly present for the sectors Consumer Discretionary, Materials and Telecom-
munications. The results for correlations between stocks from different sectors are
somewhat less pronounced but point towards the same conclusion.
- insert Tables 11 and 12 about here -
We find a similar type of asymmetric response of correlations following announce-
ments of target rate decreases and increases. In case the target rate is increased,
intra- and inter-sector correlations appear to jump to a higher level independent of
the magnitude of the surprise. By contrast, if the target rate is lowered, the mag-
nitude of the surprise is an important determinant of the change in correlations.
No significant asymmetries are found in the effects of announcements in different
business cycle phases on correlations.
4 Conclusions
We use high-frequency intraday data for the S&P100 constituents to analyze the
effects of FOMC announcements on the Federal funds target rate on stock returns,
volatilities and correlations. Unique features of our analysis are the use of high-
frequency data, our focus on individual stock returns, and with it also considering
the impact of FOMC announcements on correlations. We first confirm in this setting
the general finding that only surprises in the target rate change matter, whereas
expected changes do not. This is consistent with market efficiency. The response in
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stock prices, volatilities and correlations are substantial. For example, an unexpected
10 basis points increase of the target rate leads on average to a 46 basis points
negative stock return within five minutes after the announcement. It also increases
stock volatility during the 60-minute window around the announcement with 51
basis points, while correlations double from 0.20 to 0.40 on average.
Second, we find that positive surprises in the target rate (bad news for stocks)
trigger a stronger reaction in stock prices than negative surprises (good news for
stocks). This result differs markedly from that of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005),
who document weak support at best for asymmetric effects of positive and nega-
tive monetary policy surprises based on daily stock returns. This demonstrates the
advantage of using intraday data.
Third, we see an interesting pattern in the asymmetric response that has not been
documented before. In particular we find that for positive surprises the fact that
there is news is more important than the magnitude of the surprise. In contrast, for
negative surprises, the magnitude of the surprise is more important. This result holds
for returns, volatilities and correlations. This finding adds to the list of behavioral
biases of investors, specifically when it comes to negative news.
Finally, we find considerable heterogeneity in the effects of target rate surprises
across sectors. As expected, the Financials sector shows the strongest response to
surprises. IT stocks also react strongly, whereas Utilities stocks respond the least.
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Appendix A: Federal funds target rate changes and
surprises
Date Time FFt ∆FFt Surprise Date Time FFt ∆FFt Surprise
May 20,1997 14:15 5.50 0 −9.9 Jan 30, 2002 14:16 1.75 0 2
Jul 2, 1997 14:15 5.50 0 −1.6 Mar 19, 2002 14:19 1.75 0 −2.6
Aug 19, 1997 14:15 5.50 0 0 May 7, 2002 14:14 1.75 0 0.6
Sep 30, 1997 14:13 5.50 0 0 Jun 26, 2002 14:13 1.75 0 0.5
Nov 12, 1997 14:12 5.50 0 −5 Aug 13, 2002 14:14 1.75 0 3.4
Dec 16, 1997 14:15 5.50 0 0 Sep 24, 2002 14:12 1.75 0 3
Feb 4, 1998 14:12 5.50 0 0.6 Nov 6, 2002 14:14 1.25 -50 −18.8
Mar 31, 1998 14:14 5.50 0 0 Dec 10, 2002 14:13 1.25 0 0
May 19, 1998 14:13 5.50 0 −2.6 Jan 20, 2003 14:16 1.25 0 0.5
Jul 1, 1998 14:14 5.50 0 0 Mar 18, 2003 14:15 1.25 0 2.4
Aug 18, 1998 14:12 5.50 0 0 May 6, 2003 14:13 1.25 0 3.1
Sep 29, 1998 14:17 5.25 -25 6 Jun 25, 2003 14:16 1.00 -25 12.5
Oct 15, 1998 15:14 5.00 -25 −26.2 Aug 12, 2003 14:15 1.00 0 0
Nov 17, 1998 14:19 4.75 -25 −6.9 Sep 16, 2003 14:19 1.00 0 0
Dec 22, 1998 14:13 4.75 0 0 Oct 28, 2003 14:14 1.00 0 −0.5
Feb 3, 1999 14:12 4.75 0 0 Dec 9, 2003 14:14 1.00 0 0
Mar 30, 1999 14:12 4.75 0 0 Jan 28, 2004 14:14 1.00 0 0.3
May 18, 1999 14:11 4.75 0 −1.2 Mar 16, 2004 14:15 1.00 0 0
Jun 30, 1999 14:15 5.00 25 −4 May 4, 2006 14:16 1.00 0 −1.1
Aug 24, 1999 14:14 5.25 25 3.5 Jun 30, 2004 14:18 1.25 25 −1
Oct 5, 1999 14:12 5.25 0 −4.8 Aug 10, 2004 14:15 1.50 25 1.5
Nov 16, 1999 14:16 5.50 25 7.5 Sep 21, 2004 14:15 1.75 25 0
Dec 21, 1999 14:13 5.50 0 0 Nov 10, 2004 14:15 2.00 25 0
Feb 2, 2000 14:14 5.75 25 −5.9 Dec 14.2004 14:16 2.25 25 −0.9
Mar 21, 2000 14:15 6.00 25 −3.1 Feb 2, 2005 14:17 2.50 25 −0.5
May 16, 2000 14:13 6.50 50 4.1 Mar 22, 2005 14:17 2.75 25 1.7
Jun 28, 2000 14:15 6.50 0 −2.5 May 3, 2005 14:16 3.00 25 0
Aug 22, 2000 14:14 6.50 0 −1.7 Jun 30, 2005 14:15 3.25 25 0
Oct 3, 2000 14:12 6.50 0 −0.6 Aug 9, 2005 14:17 3.50 25 0
Nov 15, 2000 14:12 6.50 0 −1 Sep 20, 2005 14:17 3.75 25 3
Dec 19, 2000 14:16 6.50 0 6.5 Nov 1, 2005 14:18 4.00 25 0
Jan 3, 2001 13:13 6.00 -50 −36.5 Dec 13, 2005 14:13 4.25 25 0.9
Jan 31, 2001 14:15 5.50 -50 3.5 Jan 31, 2006 14:14 4.50 25 0.5
Mar 20, 2001 14:13 5.00 -50 5.6 Mar 28, 2006 14:17 4.75 25 1
Apr 18, 2001 10:54 4.50 -50 −42.5 May 10, 2006 14:17 5.00 25 0.7
May 15, 2001 14:15 4.00 -50 −7.8 Jun 29, 2006 14:16 5.25 25 −1.5
Jun 27, 2001 14:12 3.75 -25 11 Aug 8, 2006 14:14 5.25 0 −4
Aug 21, 2001 14:13 3.50 -25 1.6 Sep 20, 2006 14:14 5.25 0 0
Sep 17, 2001 08:20 3.00 -50 −28.9 Oct 25, 2006 14:13 5.25 0 0.5
Oct 2, 2001 14:15 2.50 -50 −3.2
Nov 6, 2001 14:20 2.00 -50 −13.1
Dec 11, 2001 14:14 1.75 -25 0
Note: The table presents dates and exact times of the FOMC announcements on Federal funds target rate decisions.
The column FFt contains the post-announcement level of the target rate in percent. The columns ∆FFt and Surpise
show the announced change in the target rate and the surprise therein, respectively, in basis points.
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Table 1: Five-minute returns following FOMC announcements
All Rate Rate Positive Negative
increase decrease surprise surprise
(77 obs) (23 obs) (12 obs) (28 obs) (26 obs)
All stocks (100 stocks) −3.79∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ −21.06∗∗∗ 12.19∗∗∗
(51.66) (43.08) (83.82) (50.22) (62.30)
Consumer Discretionary (15) −3.35∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 2.11∗∗∗ −22.35∗∗∗ 14.15∗∗∗
(49.30) (46.58) (78.81) (41.49) (62.86)
Consumer Staples (11) −3.62∗∗∗ −0.31 −2.73∗∗∗ −18.39∗∗∗ 8.93∗∗∗
(42.28) (31.35) (70.38) (42.91) (49.01)
Energy (6) −2.17∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗ −0.51 −14.63∗∗∗ 10.26∗∗∗
(45.78) (28.84) (75.39) (49.66) (50.20)
Financials (14) −3.08∗∗∗ 8.98∗∗∗ 7.93∗∗∗ −23.78∗∗∗ 18.92∗∗∗
(70.54) (61.16) (121.39) (65.22) (91.12)
Health Care (10) −2.54∗∗∗ −0.91∗∗ −0.78 −15.54∗∗∗ 10.07∗∗∗
(39.80) (33.68) (59.97) (39.46) (45.16)
Industrials (14) −5.05∗∗∗ −3.06∗∗∗ 0.22 −20.36∗∗∗ 8.62∗∗∗
(43.41) (38.50) (66.47) (40.42) (52.09)
IT (13) −6.26∗∗∗ 3.50∗∗∗ −1.07 −29.30∗∗∗ 13.77∗∗∗
(61.00) (45.08) (96.84) (65.86) (67.37)
Materials (7) −3.68∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗ 1.73∗ −19.76∗∗∗ 12.78∗∗∗
(45.59) (43.38) (71.64) (42.44) (54.57)
Telecommunications (5) −4.06∗∗∗ 2.04∗∗∗ 6.15∗∗∗ −22.27∗∗∗ 9.39∗∗∗
(57.22) (38.43) (98.61) (57.12) (69.42)
Utilities (5) −1.37∗∗∗ 0.54 1.18 −14.52∗∗∗ 8.46∗∗∗
(35.00) (34.45) (47.62) (34.58) (37.41)
Note: The table reports the average return in basis points during the five-minute interval
following FOMC announcements for the 77 scheduled FOMC meetings from May 1997 to Oc-
tober 2006, with standard deviations given in parentheses. The table shows equally weighted
averages across the individual constituents of the S&P100 index aggregated to the market level
(all stocks) and sector level. Columns headed ‘Rate increase (decrease)’ show average returns
following the announcement of an increase (decrease) of the Federal funds target rate. Columns
headed ‘Positive (negative) surprise’ show average returns following a positive (negative) sur-
prise in the target rate change, where the surprise is computed as the difference between the
closing price of the nearby Fed funds futures contract one day before the announcement and
on the announcement day itself, as given in (1). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2: Response of stock prices to actual target rate changes and surprises
Rate Changes Surprises & Expected Surprise, Expected & Reversal
β R2 β γ R2 β γ δ R2
All stocks (100) −0.08 0.01 −4.58∗∗∗ 0.12 0.19 −3.97∗∗∗ −0.06 −18.08∗∗∗ 0.28
(0.31) (1.04) (0.23) (0.96) (0.21) (3.62)
Cons. Discr. (15) −0.08 0.01 −4.53∗∗∗ 0.11 0.21 −3.89∗∗∗ −0.08 −21.03∗∗∗ 0.31
(0.30) (0.99) (0.24) (0.88) (0.20) (4.02)
Cons. Staples (11) −0.01 0.01 −3.44∗∗∗ 0.13 0.15 −2.74∗∗∗ −0.06 −18.93∗∗∗ 0.29
(0.21) (0.93) (0.18) (0.77) (0.14) (2.00)
Energy (6) −0.13 0.02 −3.91∗∗∗ 0.06 0.15 −3.33∗∗∗ −0.10 −22.11∗∗ 0.26
(0.41) (1.23) (0.25) (1.13) (0.22) (10.42)
Financials (14) −0.08 0.01 −6.42∗∗∗ 0.19 0.18 −5.22∗∗∗ −0.15 −33.62∗∗∗ 0.33
(0.44) (1.79) (0.37) (1.62) (0.31) (5.24)
Health Care (10) −0.07 0.01 −3.42∗∗∗ 0.07 0.16 −3.02∗∗∗ −0.04 −12.34∗∗∗ 0.24
(0.21) (0.71) (0.17) (0.68) (0.17) (4.25)
Industrials (14) −0.12 0.02 −3.74∗∗∗ 0.04 0.18 −3.37∗∗∗ −0.06 −11.58∗∗∗ 0.24
(0.22) (0.79) (0.15) (0.76) (0.15) (3.32)
IT (13) −0.02 0.00 −6.63∗∗∗ 0.26 0.25 −5.98∗∗∗ 0.09 −17.56∗∗∗ 0.32
(0.39) (1.39) (0.27) (1.37) (0.27) (5.50)
Materials (7) −0.10 0.01 −4.42∗∗∗ 0.09 0.23 −4.09∗∗∗ 0.01 1.36 0.28
(0.30) (0.82) (0.22) (0.83) (0.22) (8.64)
Telecomm. (5) −0.20 0.02 −4.51∗∗∗ −0.01 0.18 −3.90∗∗∗ −0.19 −21.16∗∗ 0.27
(0.33) (1.15) (0.28) (1.08) (0.26) (8.40)
Utilities (5) −0.05 0.02 −2.62∗∗∗ 0.06 0.13 −2.33∗∗∗ −0.03 −14.25∗∗ 0.18
(0.18) (0.63) (0.15) (0.61) (0.15) (6.77)
Note: The table shows results from regressions of the stock returns (in basis points) during the five-
minute interval following FOMC announcements on Federal funds rate changes (equation (4)), on
surprises and expected rate changes (equation (5)), and on surprises and expected rate changes allow-
ing for different effects of reversal decisions (equation (6)). The models are estimated for individual
stock returns for the constituents of the S&P100 index following the 77 scheduled FOMC meetings
between May 1997 and October 2006. Average coefficient estimates and R2 values are shown for the
market (all stocks) and sectors. The superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, based on the standard errors given in parentheses, which allow
for heteroskedasticity as well as correlation of residuals across stocks.
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Table 4: Mean change of realized volatility following FOMC announcements
All Rate Rate Positive Negative
increase decrease surprise surprise
(77 obs) (23 obs) (12 obs) (28 obs) (26 obs)
All stocks (100 stocks) 34.77∗∗∗ 33.56∗∗∗ 66.69∗∗∗ 45.72∗∗∗ 42.48∗∗∗
(57.16) (45.20) (68.84) (62.17) (60.74)
Consumer Discretionary (15) 31.12∗∗∗ 31.69∗∗∗ 61.67∗∗∗ 41.27∗∗∗ 37.07∗∗∗
(53.97) (51.82) (65.51) (52.15) (64.10)
Consumer Staples (11) 28.68∗∗∗ 26.55∗∗∗ 52.22∗∗∗ 40.64∗∗∗ 31.30∗∗∗
(42.32) (36.93) (53.37) (42.41) (44.86)
Energy (6) 24.14∗∗∗ 17.68∗∗∗ 45.50∗∗∗ 29.41∗∗∗ 31.15∗∗∗
(92.05) (35.74) (66.53) (135.37) (56.24)
Financials (14) 50.44∗∗∗ 54.18∗∗∗ 96.61∗∗∗ 61.24∗∗∗ 66.36∗∗∗
(65.12) (63.24) (84.72) (56.61) (83.01)
Health Care (10) 25.73∗∗∗ 28.24∗∗∗ 51.69∗∗∗ 36.01∗∗∗ 30.85∗∗∗
(45.71) (30.48) (52.42) (45.34) (48.85)
Industrials (14) 33.50∗∗∗ 30.89∗∗∗ 57.41∗∗∗ 43.45∗∗∗ 38.96∗∗∗
(46.40) (38.44) (56.49) (46.59) (49.79)
IT (13) 42.92∗∗∗ 38.75∗∗∗ 88.77∗∗∗ 58.49∗∗∗ 54.14∗∗∗
(63.03) (44.26) (80.35) (69.77) (62.53)
Materials (7) 33.37∗∗∗ 32.21∗∗∗ 60.15∗∗∗ 42.50∗∗∗ 38.25∗∗∗
(43.92) (34.79) (54.51) (45.82) (45.53)
Telecommunications (5) 42.09∗∗∗ 31.72∗∗∗ 87.35∗∗∗ 57.36∗∗∗ 51.24∗∗∗
(66.55) (41.79) (82.54) (75.94) (67.69)
Utilities (5) 21.40∗∗∗ 23.72∗∗∗ 36.73∗∗∗ 30.46∗∗∗ 26.55∗∗∗
(44.64) (30.08) (39.82) (40.66) (38.13)
Note: The table reports the average daily change of realized volatility in basis points during
60-minute windows (from 10 minutes before until 50 minutes after) around FOMC announce-
ments on days of the 77 scheduled FOMC meetings from May 1997 to October 2006, with
standard deviations given in parentheses. The table shows equally weighted averages across
the individual constituents of the S&P100 index aggregated to the market level (all stocks)
and sector level. Columns headed ‘Rate increase (decrease)’ show average volatilities following
the announcement of an increase (decrease) of the Federal funds target rate. Columns headed
‘Positive (negative) surprise’ show average volatilities following a positive (negative) surprise
in the target rate change, where the surprise is computed as the difference between the closing
price of the nearby Fed funds futures contract one day before the announcement and on the
announcement day itself, as given in (1). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Response of realized volatilities to actual target rate changes and surprises
Rate Changes Surprises & Expected Surprise, Expected & Reversal
β R2 β γ R2 β γ δ R2
All stocks (100) 0.78∗∗∗ 0.07 5.15∗∗∗ 0.26 0.19 5.10∗∗∗ 0.19 8.32∗∗ 0.23
(0.10) (0.91) (0.18) (0.90) (0.18) (3.71)
Cons. Discr. (15) 0.81∗∗∗ 0.08 4.23∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.17 4.21∗∗∗ 0.29∗ 11.16∗∗∗ 0.21
(0.09) (0.88) (0.17) (0.86) (0.16) (2.95)
Cons. Staples (11) 0.47∗∗∗ 0.04 3.92∗∗∗ 0.12 0.14 3.80∗∗∗ 0.00 13.85∗∗∗ 0.24
(0.09) (0.78) (0.18) (0.68) (0.18) (1.51)
Energy (6) 0.62∗∗ 0.01 4.77∗ −0.06 0.12 4.71∗ −0.10 0.14 0.13
(0.26) (2.57) (0.65) (2.60) (0.66) (41.08)
Financials (14) 1.20∗∗∗ 0.10 7.79∗∗∗ 0.41 0.26 7.70∗∗∗ 0.21 21.98∗∗∗ 0.34
(0.10) (1.72) (0.31) (1.65) (0.29) (7.99)
Health Care (10) 0.74∗∗∗ 0.10 4.66∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.24 4.63∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 2.85 0.25
(0.13) (0.71) (0.13) (0.71) (0.13) (3.00)
Industrials (14) 0.48∗∗∗ 0.04 4.98∗∗∗ −0.06 0.18 4.96∗∗∗ −0.08 2.78 0.19
(0.14) (0.57) (0.15) (0.57) (0.15) (2.39)
IT (13) 1.10∗∗∗ 0.10 6.74∗∗∗ 0.49 0.22 6.68∗∗∗ 0.44 6.28 0.25
(0.16) (1.35) (0.31) (1.33) (0.32) (5.37)
Materials (7) 0.67∗∗∗ 0.10 3.49∗∗∗ 0.30∗ 0.19 3.48∗∗∗ 0.30 1.44 0.19
(0.16) (0.74) (0.18) (0.80) (0.20) (7.86)
Telecomm. (5) 0.94∗∗∗ 0.07 5.93∗∗∗ 0.35 0.23 5.91∗∗∗ 0.28 12.23 0.25
(0.20) (1.21) (0.36) (1.19) (0.37) (9.67)
Utilities (5) 0.47∗∗∗ 0.07 2.52∗∗∗ 0.25 0.12 2.55∗∗∗ 0.27 −3.27 0.14
(0.17) (0.76) (0.19) (0.76) (0.19) (5.28)
Note: The table shows the results from regressions of the daily change in 60-minute realized volatilities
on absolute Federal funds rate changes (equation (8)), on absolute surprises and absolute expected
rate changes (equation (9)), and on absolute surprises and absolute expected rate changes allowing for
different effects of ‘reversal’ decisions (equation (10)). The models are estimated for the realized volatil-
ities of the individual constituents of the S&P100 index following the 77 scheduled FOMC meetings
between May 1997 and October 2006. Average coefficient estimates and R2 values are shown for the
market (all stocks) and sectors. The superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, based on the standard errors given in parentheses, which allow for
heteroskedasticity as well as correlation of residuals across stocks.
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Table 7: Mean change of intra-sector realized correlations following FOMC an-
nouncements
All Rate Rate Positive Negative
increase decrease surprise surprise
(77 obs) (23 obs) (12 obs) (28 obs) (26 obs)
All stocks (100 stocks) 0.19∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.38) (0.40) (0.37) (0.41)
Consumer Discretionary (15) 0.18∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.41) (0.41) (0.39) (0.43)
Consumer Staples (11) 0.18∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.39) (0.38) (0.37) (0.44)
Energy (6) 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.33) (0.39) (0.37) (0.34)
Financials (14) 0.23∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.35) (0.38) (0.34) (0.39)
Health Care (10) 0.19∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.37) (0.40) (0.37) (0.41)
Industrials (14) 0.17∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.37) (0.40) (0.39) (0.39)
IT (13) 0.19∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.37) (0.38) (0.36) (0.40)
Materials (7) 0.14∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.41) (0.41) (0.38) (0.46)
Telecommunications (5) 0.22∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.38) (0.35) (0.33) (0.35) (0.40)
Utilities (5) 0.18∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.43) (0.39) (0.49) (0.41) (0.43)
Note: The table reports the average daily change of intra-sector realized correlations in basis
points during 60-minute windows (from 10 minutes before until 50 minutes after) around FOMC
announcements on days of the 77 scheduled FOMC meetings from May 1997 to October 2006,
with standard deviations given in parentheses. Columns headed ‘Rate increase (decrease)’ show
average correlations following the announcement of an increase (decrease) of the Federal funds
target rate. Columns headed ‘Positive (negative) surprise’ show average correlations following
a positive (negative) surprise in the target rate change, where the surprise is computed as the
difference between the closing price of the nearby Fed funds futures contract one day before
the announcement and on the announcement day itself, as given in (1). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 8: Mean change of inter-sector realized correlations following FOMC an-
nouncements
All Rate Rate Positive Negative
increase decrease surprise surprise
(77 obs) (23 obs) (12 obs) (28 obs) (26 obs)
All stocks (100 stocks) 0.18∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.41)
Consumer Discretionary (15) 0.18∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.40) (0.40) (0.39) (0.42)
Consumer Staples (11) 0.18∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.38) (0.43)
Energy (6) 0.16∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40)
Financials (14) 0.20∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.38) (0.39) (0.37) (0.41)
Health Care (10) 0.18∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.41)
Industrials (14) 0.18∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) (0.41)
IT (13) 0.19∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.41)
Materials (7) 0.17∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.41) (0.39) (0.39) (0.43)
Telecommunications (5) 0.20∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.39) (0.37) (0.38) (0.42)
Utilities (5) 0.19∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.39) (0.41) (0.41) (0.42)
Note: The table reports the average daily change of inter-sector realized correlations in basis
points during 60-minute windows (from 10 minutes before until 50 minutes after) around FOMC
announcements on days of the 77 scheduled FOMC meetings from May 1997 to October 2006,
with standard deviations given in parentheses. Columns headed ‘Rate increase (decrease)’ show
average correlations following the announcement of an increase (decrease) of the Federal funds
target rate. Columns headed ‘Positive (negative) surprise’ show average correlations following
a positive (negative) surprise in the target rate change, where the surprise is computed as the
difference between the closing price of the nearby Fed funds futures contract one day before
the announcement and on the announcement day itself, as given in (1). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 9: Response of intra-sector realized correlations to actual target rate changes and
surprises
Rate Changes Surprises & Expected Surprise, Expected & Reversal
β R2 β γ R2 β γ δ R2
All stocks (100) 0.45∗∗∗ 0.04 2.07∗∗∗ 0.21 0.07 2.05∗∗∗ 0.18 2.23 0.08
(0.14) (0.58) (0.15) (0.58) (0.15) (2.16)
Cons. Discr. (15) 0.52∗∗∗ 0.04 2.61∗∗∗ 0.21 0.08 2.62∗∗∗ 0.18 4.82∗∗ 0.10
(0.15) (0.55) (0.15) (0.58) (0.14) (2.46)
Cons. Staples (11) 0.44∗∗∗ 0.03 1.57∗∗ 0.26 0.05 1.53∗∗ 0.22 4.62∗∗ 0.06
(0.16) (0.76) (0.20) (0.78) (0.20) (2.03)
Energy (6) 0.07 0.01 0.78 −0.01 0.04 0.74 −0.06 9.79 0.07
(0.16) (0.49) (0.20) (0.49) (0.20) (9.44)
Financials (14) 0.57∗∗∗ 0.05 2.55∗∗∗ 0.25 0.08 2.54∗∗∗ 0.20 5.90∗∗∗ 0.10
(0.17) (0.79) (0.19) (0.79) (0.18) (1.13)
Health Care (10) 0.41∗∗∗ 0.03 1.97∗∗∗ 0.23 0.06 1.93∗∗ 0.21 −1.51 0.08
(0.16) (0.74) (0.17) (0.75) (0.17) (4.34)
Industrials (14) 0.39∗∗ 0.03 2.13∗∗∗ 0.14 0.07 2.11∗∗∗ 0.12 2.48 0.08
(0.18) (0.75) (0.21) (0.76) (0.21) (3.65)
IT (13) 0.34∗∗ 0.02 1.37∗ 0.18 0.04 1.34 0.16 3.28∗∗ 0.05
(0.16) (0.83) (0.20) (0.82) (0.20) (1.53)
Materials (7) 0.68∗∗∗ 0.06 3.04∗∗∗ 0.28 0.10 2.91∗∗∗ 0.30∗ −21.16∗∗∗ 0.12
(0.22) (0.96) (0.21) (0.76) (0.17) (6.24)
Telecomm. (5) 0.56∗∗∗ 0.05 1.38 0.36 0.06 1.28 0.39∗ −24.77∗∗∗ 0.09
(0.18) (0.85) (0.22) (0.84) (0.22) (9.06)
Utilities (5) 0.32 0.02 0.77 0.35 0.05 0.71 0.31 −0.47 0.06
(0.27) (1.65) (0.34) (1.63) (0.34) (11.99)
Note: The table shows the results from regressions of the daily change in 60-minute realized correlations
on absolute Federal funds rate changes (equation (12)), on absolute surprises and absolute expected
rate changes (equation (13)), and on absolute surprises and absolute expected rate changes allowing
for different effects of ‘reversal’ decisions (equation (14)). The models are estimated using the realized
correlations between individual stocks belonging to the same sector following the 77 scheduled FOMC
meetings between May 1997 and October 2006, and are aggregated to the sector level by taking averages.
The superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively,
based on the standard errors given in parentheses, which allow for heteroskedasticity as well as correlation
of residuals across stocks.
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Table 10: Response of inter-sector realized correlations to actual target rate changes and
surprises
Rate Changes Surprises & Expected Surprise, Expected & Reversal
β R2 β γ R2 β γ δ R2
All stocks (100) 0.46∗∗∗ 0.04 1.83∗∗∗ 0.25∗ 0.06 1.80∗∗∗ 0.22 0.04 0.08
(0.13) (0.54) (0.15) (0.54) (0.14) (2.20)
Cons. Discr. (15) 0.49∗∗∗ 0.04 2.17∗∗∗ 0.24∗ 0.07 2.14∗∗∗ 0.21 0.86 0.09
(0.14) (0.53) (0.14) (0.54) (0.14) (2.19)
Cons. Staples (11) 0.45∗∗∗ 0.04 1.86∗∗∗ 0.24 0.06 1.83∗∗∗ 0.21 2.30 0.08
(0.14) (0.58) (0.16) (0.59) (0.16) (2.09)
Energy (6) 0.34∗∗∗ 0.03 1.57∗∗∗ 0.15 0.06 1.54∗∗∗ 0.11 0.02 0.08
(0.13) (0.24) (0.14) (0.26) (0.13) (2.20)
Financials (14) 0.47∗∗∗ 0.04 2.06∗∗∗ 0.22 0.07 2.04∗∗∗ 0.18 2.62∗ 0.08
(0.13) (0.57) (0.14) (0.57) (0.13) (1.57)
Health Care (10) 0.43∗∗∗ 0.03 1.69∗∗∗ 0.26∗ 0.06 1.65∗∗∗ 0.24 0.31 0.08
(0.13) (0.63) (0.15) (0.63) (0.15) (2.67)
Industrials (14) 0.45∗∗∗ 0.04 1.92∗∗∗ 0.23 0.06 1.88∗∗∗ 0.21 0.18 0.08
(0.14) (0.62) (0.16) (0.62) (0.16) (2.31)
IT (13) 0.44∗∗∗ 0.04 1.47∗∗ 0.28∗ 0.06 1.43∗∗ 0.25∗ 2.13 0.07
(0.12) (0.60) (0.16) (0.59) (0.15) (2.46)
Materials (7) 0.53∗∗∗ 0.05 2.34∗∗∗ 0.25 0.08 2.28∗∗∗ 0.24∗ −8.25∗∗∗ 0.10
(0.15) (0.60) (0.17) (0.55) (0.13) (2.58)
Telecomm. (5) 0.57∗∗∗ 0.05 1.56∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.07 1.53∗∗ 0.36∗∗ −2.85 0.09
(0.14) (0.71) (0.16) (0.72) (0.16) (3.42)
Utilities (5) 0.38∗∗ 0.03 1.13∗ 0.31∗ 0.05 1.07∗ 0.29 −4.96∗ 0.07
(0.15) (0.67) (0.18) (0.65) (0.18) (2.93)
Note: The table shows the results from regressions of the daily change in 60-minute realized correlations
on absolute Federal funds rate changes (equation (12)), on absolute surprises and absolute expected
rate changes (equation (13)), and on absolute surprises and absolute expected rate changes allowing
for different effects of ‘reversal’ decisions (equation (14)). The models are estimated using the realized
correlations between individual stocks belonging to different sectors following the 77 scheduled FOMC
meetings between May 1997 and October 2006, and are aggregated to the sector level by taking
averages. The superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively, based on the standard errors given in parentheses, which allow for heteroskedasticity as
well as correlation of residuals across stocks.
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Figure 1: Stock returns around FOMC announcements
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Note: The figure shows the average returns for the S&P100 constituents in five-minute intervals
around the announcement of the Federal funds target rate decision. The label ’5’ on the horizontal
axis indicates the average return in the first 5 minutes after the announcement. The graph is based
on the 77 scheduled FOMC meetings between May 1997 and October 2006, which are split into 23
’No surprise’, 28 ’Positive surprise’ and 26 ’Negative surprise’ cases.
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Figure 2: Volatility changes around FOMC announcements
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Note: The figure shows the average change in absolute return for the S&P100 constituents in five-
minute intervals around the announcements of the Federal funds target rate decision, relative to
the pre-announcement day. The label ’5’ on the horizontal axis indicates the average return in the
first 5 minutes after the announcement. The graph is based on the 77 scheduled FOMC meetings
between May 1997 and October 2006, which are split into 23 ’No surprise’, 28 ’Positive surprise’
and 26 ’Negative surprise’ cases.
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Figure 3: Correlation changes around FOMC announcements
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Note: The figure shows the average change in cross-products of returns taken over all possible pairs
of S&P100 constituents in five-minute intervals around the announcement of the Federal funds
target rate decision, relative to the pre-announcement day. The cross-product of returns of stocks
i and j during the k-th interval is normalized with their realized volatilities over the window from
15 minutes before until 75 minutes after the announcement time, that is (Rit,kRjt,k)/(RVitRVjt),
where RVit and RVjt are computed according to (2) with l = −3 and u = 14. The label ’5’ on the
horizontal axis indicates the average return in the first 5 minutes after the announcement. The
graph is based on the 77 scheduled FOMC meetings between May 1997 and October 2006, which
are split into 23 ’No surprise’, 28 ’Positive surprise’ and 26 ’Negative surprise’ cases.
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